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This paper connects two strands of the literature on social trust by estimating the effects 
of trust on growth through a set of potential transmission mechanisms directly. It does 
so by modelling the process using a three-stage least squares estimator on a sample of 
countries for which a full data set is available. The results indicate that trust affects 
schooling and the rule of law directly. These variables in turn affect the investment rate 
(schooling) and provide a direct effect (rule of law) on the growth rate. The paper closes 
with a short discussion of the relevance of the findings. 
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  11. Introduction 
Since the late 1980s, the term social capital has gradually become accepted as a 
standard phrase in the social science vocabulary. Defined by Robert Putnam (1993, p. 
167) as “features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can 
improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions”, the concept hit a 
note with both social scientists and politicians, since most people would agree that 
collective action is an important part of modern life and society. As such, the concept 
makes immediate intuitive sense and while buzz words are common phenomena in the 
social sciences – fancy new concepts that generate attention have come and gone for 
more than a century – a substantial empirical literature has confirmed that features of 
social capital are indeed important determinants of a number of political and economic 
features. Recent research nonetheless increasingly distinguishes between the constituent 
elements of Putnam’s concept, documenting that many consequences of social capital 
are entirely due to the trust element, which empirical studies show forms a component 
that is only weakly related to the other elements of the concept (Stolle, 1998; Uslaner, 
2002; Bjørnskov, 2006).  
Putnam (1993) claimed that social capital could explain the growth differences 
across Italian regions during the post-WW2 period. Knack and Keefer’s (1997) seminal 
paper on economic growth showed that only social trust is robustly associated with 
growth, and one of the most important and robust results emerging from the subsequent 
empirical literature is that while norms and networks are unrelated to overall economic 
performance, countries with high levels of trust have grown faster in recent decades 
than other comparable countries (Whiteley, 2000; Zak and Knack, 2001; Beugelsdijk et 
al., 2004). The social capital literature also implicitly points to a number of potential 
transmission mechanisms; one need only take a quick look to realize that trust is 
associated with a number of features that would appear on most economists’ shortlist of 
important determinants of economic growth. Yet, the existing studies have not made the 
connection explicitly. It is therefore the purpose of this paper to connect the potential 
transmission channels of the trust-growth relation by estimating the influence of each 
channel directly. The paper is organized as follows.  Based on previous literature, 
section 2 describes a number of potential transmission channels for social trust. Section 
3 summarizes the data and the estimation strategy used in sections 4 and 5. Section 4 
  2briefly explores a set of background variables for social trust while section 5 estimates 
the growth effects of social trust through its influence on the potential transmission 
channels. Section 6 discusses the findings and concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical transmission channels 
As noted in the introduction, the social capital literature points to a set of possible 
transmission channels, as a number of the features that are found to be affected by social 
trust also emerge on most lists of determinants of economic growth. This section 
reviews evidence of the associations between social trust and five different potential 
determinants of growth, all of which have been suggested by the social capital literature. 




First of all, in one of the original papers on social capital Coleman (1988) argued that it 
is a factor in creating human capital, a point later confirmed in cross-country data by la 
Porta et al. (1997) and in cross-state data from the US by Putnam (2001).
1 The original 
explanation for Coleman’s results was that in high-trust environments, people are more 
likely to help each other; i.e. high school students are more likely to access the human 
capital of adults within the family and neighborhood and are therefore more likely to 
succeed. The same would, according to this logic, be the case for fellow students who 
trusting that favors will in general be returned would have an incentive to give other 
students access to their human capital. As trust therefore so to speak squares the circle 
of competition versus cooperation between students, this line of thinking thus in essence 
provides a supply-side explanation. Trust might alternatively proxy for the strength of 
‘social solidarity’ in a country, which could affect government expenditures on 
education. Given that the supply of educational possibility is affected by expenditures in 
the educational system, this would lead to a similar supply effect. On the other hand, 
demand-side explanations could be equally convincing, as firms in countries with high 
social trust are more likely to easily solve the agency problems inherent in any 
                                                   
1 Coleman’s study is strictly speaking not among the very first papers on social capital, that honour must 
probably go to David Hume and Adam Smith (Bruni and Sugden, 2000). Later, Jacobs (1961), Loury (1977) 
and Bourdieu (1986) have also used concepts of social capital although without the broad popularity that 
Coleman’s study received.  
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tasks that are less easily monitored, increasing social trust is likely to generate a higher 
demand for education (Bjørnskov, 2005). Either way, as a first potential mechanism 
trust might therefore lead to growth as schooling is often found to be a significant 
growth factor (Barro, 1991; Temple, 2001; Weede and Kämpf, 2002). 
However, the correlation between social trust and schooling could alternatively 
reflect the reverse causal direction. A number of studies have argued that instead of 
affecting schooling, trust is itself created in the schooling system as a result of 
socialization to common norms, through demonstration effects arising from teachers 
sanctioning trusting and cooperative behaviour, and effects arising from the fact that 
children are given information and mental tools that enables them to better interpret and 
asses the actions of others (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Glaeser et al., 2000; Gradstein and 
Justman, 2000; Knack and Zak, 2002). Given this direction of causality, part of the 
effect of trust on growth might be spurious due to the correlation with schooling. 
Considerable care is therefore needed in order to sort out the causal direction. 
 
2.2. Governance 
A second potential mechanism derives from Putnam’s (1993) original work. In the book 
that popularized the concept and a later article by Helliwell and Putnam (1995), he 
argues that differences in social capital have led to the observed differences in the 
quality of governance across Italian regions. Multiple mechanisms can theoretically lead 
to this effect. Knack (2002), who finds evidence of the relation in cross-state US data, 
stresses demand-side explanations by pointing out three different mechanisms through 
which trust could affect governance. Firstly, high trust could lead to higher 
accountability, as decisions have to be responsive to the preferences of the populace. 
This argument is along the lines of Putnam’s original thoughts in which he stresses the 
association between trust and ‘civicness’, arguing that more civic citizens are better at 
holding politicians accountable and politicians therefore “are more inclined to temper 
their worst impulses rather than force public protests” (Putnam, 2000, p. 346).  
Secondly, consensus or agreement is least likely when political positions are polarized. 
However, even in countries in which the positions of politicians and voters are strongly 
polarized, those with high trust are likely to experience more situations in which 
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that they will be compensated in future decisions for any cost imposed on them through 
current policy decisions. In such situations, sufficient trust thus helps politicians and 
voters surmount a prisoners’ dilemma-like problem associated with intertemporal 
logrolling, which lowers the risk of myopic policy-making.
2 Thirdly, Knack (2002) 
finds that US states with high trust are more likely to introduce policy innovations, 
possibly because trustworthy politicians are better at credibly signaling their necessity 
and thus avoiding popular skepticism to apparently obscure institutional changes. 
Conversely, in low-trust societies voters will be more inclined to interpret policy 
innovations as concessions to special interests that may bias policy choices, thereby 
making any innovation less likely to receive the necessary public support. 
Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow (1972), on the other hand, hinted at what is 
basically a supply-side explanation for the trust-governance association by remarking 
that “the system [of judges and police] would itself disappear if on each occasion they 
were to sell their services and decisions […] To the extent that it is incomplete, it must 
be supplemented by an implicit or explicit social contract. Thus one might loosely say 
that the categorical imperative and the price system are essential complements” (Arrow, 
1972, p.357). In his view, officials in high-trust countries are therefore more likely to 
honor the social contract that all societies implicitly rest upon. The logical consequence 
is that more social trust leads to a higher supply of quality decisions in the bureaucracy 
and the political process and hence better governance, which is also consistent with the 
observable negative association between trust and corruption (Uslaner, 2002). Both 
demand and supply mechanisms therefore lead to the consequence that trust is 
associated with the quality of policy-making, which is mostly found to be an important 
determinant of growth.
3
The overall implication has received strong empirical support. The first empirical 
studies confirming that social trust leads to improved governance occurred in Putnam 
(1993), and the result has since been replicated in both US state data and cross-country 
                                                   
2 This might also imply that high-trust countries can sustain a wider representation of diverse political parties in 
the political process without risking that this diversity leads to political instability. 
3 While earlier empirical studies may have questioned the association between governance or institutional 
quality and growth, more recent research seems to concentrate on the question of how ‘deep’ a determinant 
governance is (e.g. Dollar and Kraay, 2003; Rodrik et al., 2004). 
  5analysis (la Porta et al., 1997; Rice and Sumberg, 1997; Knack, 2002). The original 
paper by Knack and Keefer (1997) suggests that trust can be created by formal 
institutions such as a strong rule of law, a lead taken up by. Zak and Knack (2001, p. 
316) who also suggest the reverse causal direction by stating that their results “strongly 
support […] that formal institutions and social homogeneity increase growth in part by 
building trust”. Paraphrasing the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard, the rule of law 
in this line of thinking shortens ‘the leap of faith’ inherent in any act of trust and 
therefore makes trust more likely. Rothstein (2003) alternatively surmise that when 
individuals observe corrupt behavior in public institutions, they infer from that 
observation that people in general are not to be trusted. Hence, institutional quality and 
non-corrupt behavior in his view leads to higher trust, a direction of causality that 
receives empirical support in Knack and Zak (2002) and Berggren and Jordahl (in 
press), positing that proper legal protection induces people to be more likely to trust. In 
total, which direction causality runs remains an open question that, like in the case of 
schooling, makes the choice of an appropriate estimation procedure important. Yet, one 
way or the other social trust might be correlated with growth through its association 
with governance, which most studies find to be an important growth factor (Kormendi 
and Meguire, 1985; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Berggren, 2003; Dollar and Kraay, 2003; 
Rodrik et al., 2004). 
 
2.3. Investments 
As a third possibility, Arrow (1972, p. 357) noted that “virtually every commercial 
transaction has within itself an element of trust, certainly any transaction conducted 
over a period of time”. As investments are undertaken in order to maximize the number 
and size of such transactions in the future, it could well be expected that social trust 
affects the investment rate either directly or through increasing intra-country trade and 
economic activity. Pointing to yet another potential growth factor, Zak and Knack 
(2001) take this lead by arguing that trust leads to increased investments through a 
theoretical direct effect in which investment brokers are intermediaries between 
investors and firms. In the model, the lack of trustworthiness of these brokers incurs 
upon society a transaction cost associated with investments, which lowers the 
investment rate. The authors subsequently find support in data from 51 countries. By 
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of the most important growth factors (Barro, 1991; Levine and Renelt, 1992; Wazciarg, 
2001). 
A related hypothesis is that investment prices are affected by social trust having a 
governance-like effect on investment policy, possibly since more civic-minded 
politicians in the vein of Putnam’s arguments are more likely to balance diverse 
interests, or that increased transparency of government actions reduces risks due to 
political instability and thus also reduces the costs of investments. In a contribution 
predating the social capital concept, Niklas Luhman (1979) made the additional point 
that trust reduces the complexity of modern society, which could as a possible 
implication have that the span of contingencies to consider with any economic 
transaction or activity is reduced. Social trust may therefore also work as a risk-reducing 
factor per se that e.g. leads to higher investment rates or lowers the price of investments 
by making society more stable and predictable, which would lower transaction costs and 
enable firms to undertake longer-term commitments. 
 
2.4. International trade 
Fourthly, Greif (1989, 1994) uses historical examples of trade across the Mediterranean 
in Medieval times and de Groot et al. (2004) employ current bilateral trade patterns to 
demonstrate that trust might influence the extent and direction of trade by providing 
better security of the gains of trade. Both studies stress the influence of trust on 
transaction costs as having trustworthy partners abroad lowers the risks of 
noncompliance with trade contracts and therefore lower transaction costs. De Groot et 
al. (2004), following Anderson and Marcouiller (2002), also mention that the quality of 
formal institutions could have a similar effect. However, they find that most of the trust 
effect on the direction of trade arises directly and only a minor part is due to an indirect 
effect through governance. Social trust might also via this mechanism be connected to 
investments and growth by allowing countries to trade more extensively with foreign 
partners.  
 
  72.5. Government  
Finally, a number of authors connect social trust to the size and structure of the 
government sector by observing that the Nordic countries have both highly trusting 
populations and extensive welfare states. Rothstein (2003) and Kumlin and Rothstein 
(2004) suggest that trust is associated with the supply of universal welfare goods while 
means-tested welfare is bad for trust, based on the explanation that means-testing 
stigmatizes the poor while excluding citizens slightly better off from welfare goods. 
This, they argue, creates social cleavages and a sense of unequal access to public goods, 
which reduces social trust. Svendsen (2004), on the other hand, makes the opposite 
point by arguing that high-trust countries have been better able to maintain extensive 
welfare states precisely because the high trust levels to some degree have insulated 
these nations from adverse behavior and moral hazard. The provision of universal 
welfare extended to a large part of the population incurs significant monitoring and 
enforcement costs to ensure that only those eligible to different welfare benefits actually 
receive them. Svendsen (2004) argues that in high-trust countries, a substantial part of 
the population does not need monitoring as they are likely to behave in an honest 
manner, thereby lowering the transaction costs of supplying public welfare goods. As 
such, this argument may go some way in explaining why the Nordic countries 
apparently can support welfare systems without surrendering to costs that would destroy 
the system from within in less trusting countries. Some level of social trust might 
therefore be necessary to sustain a large government sector. 
However, it is important to stress that a variety of indirect mechanisms could also 
lead to either of these five outcomes. Good governance might for example be associated 
with better investment policy or social and political stability, both of which would 
reduce transaction costs. Governance might alternatively secure more productive 
investments as firms would be insulated from some of the political risks and would 
therefore be more inclined to undertake more economically risky endeavors. As another 
indirect mechanism, social trust could influence the investment rate through its potential 
effect on schooling, since human capital theoretically might be a complement to 
physical capital (e.g. Nelson and Phelps, 1966; Romer, 1990; Topel, 1999). Likewise, if 
social trust affects the extent of trade an indirect mechanism through the investment rate 
might affect growth (e.g. Levine and Renelt, 1992; Wazciarg, 2001). Conversely, a 
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may weaken incentives and crowd out investments, thereby leading to lower growth 
(Barro, 1991). In the following, it is hence necessary to take potential indirect effects 
into account.  
In summary, a number of studies have connected social trust to potential 
determinants of economic growth. The above mini survey of the literature leaves us 
with at least five different mechanisms linking trust to growth to explore in the 
following: 1) schooling; 2) governance; 3) a direct investment link; 4) investment 
prices; and 5) government expenditures. The next section describes the data used for 
measuring effects through these mechanisms. 
 
3. Data and estimation strategy 
First of all, I use what has become the standard trust indicator, which is the proportion 
of a population that answers yes to the question: “In general, do you think that most 
people can be trusted, or can’t you be too careful?” This question has been asked in a 
number of countries by the World Values Survey (WVS) since 1981 and is usually 
found to be a good indicator of what it is intended to measure.
4 As a number of studies 
all find that the trust scores are stationary over time (Volken, 2002; Bjørnskov, 2005), 
the variable used in the following is the average of all available observations from each 
country. The stability of the trust measures hence implies that panel data estimates do 
not make much sense as most of the variation over time is likely to be random. I 
supplement the WVS data with recent trust scores from the Danish Social Capital 
Project that asks the exact WVS question, and the Latinobarometro, which has asked a 
very similar question. The trust scores on the full sample of 86 countries are listed in the 
appendix. The sample used in the following is substantially reduced due to data 
availability while Iran and China are dropped as both countries are outliers in most 
respects (Uslaner, 2002; Bjørnskov, 2005). 
Some authors have questioned the validity of the use of surveys in economics, and 
in particular the use of the social trust measure. For example, the November 2002 issue 
of The Economic Journal was devoted to social capital research, including the question 
                                                   
4 The most recent data derive from Inglehart et al. (2004) while trust scores from earlier waves of the WVS can 
be downloaded on the homepage. The Latinobarometro data can be accessed at  
http://www.latinobarometro.com while the Danish data are available from the author. 
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confusion seems to derive from the often rather indiscriminate use of the term ‘social 
capital’. As Bjørnskov (2006) shows that Putnam’s concept at the macroeconomic level 
consists of three orthogonal factors, this confusion can be avoided by using social trust 
instead of one of the many measures proposed in the literature that all tend to pool 
elements of these orthogonal factors. Moreover, national social trust scores have proved 
to be a fairly valid measure of honesty, trust and trustworthiness. For example, Knack 
(2001) shows that the scores correlate heavily with the share of wallets returned in 
wallet drop experiments from capitals around the world. Uslaner (2002) also shows that 
social trust is strongly associated with a number of other outcomes such as corruption 
and violent crime that one would a priori require of any valid measure. 
Turning to the potential transmission channels, education or human capital has 
proved to be difficult to measure and the theoretically strong association with economic 
growth therefore often finds surprisingly weak empirical support (e.g. Lorgelly and 
Owen, 1999; Pritchett, 2001; Temple, 2001). A major problem in this respect is that 
most existing indicators only measure the quantity of schooling; studies using these 
indicators thereby implicitly come to assume that the quality of schooling is equal 
across countries and time. What is more, while primary education could arguably be of 
paramount importance to developing countries, most rich countries have mandatory 
primary schooling requirements, and endogenous growth models based on technological 
change more relevant to developed countries suggest an influence of higher education 
instead of basic skills (e.g. Nelson and Phelps, 1966; Romer, 1990). In order to measure 
human capital in a sufficiently precise and parsimonious way, the present schooling 
indicator is therefore the result of performing a principal components analysis with three 
different measures of education: 1) the average intelligence quotient from Lynn and 
Vanhanen (2002), used as a measure of the quality of human capital, as it provides a 
proxy for the average analytical skills of the population; 2) the gross enrollment rate in 
secondary school from World Bank (2004); and 3) the average schooling length of 
individuals over the age of 25 from Barro and Lee (2001). These three variables load 
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consequently consists of the factor scores from this analysis.
5  
The data on governance derive from the Kaufmann et al. (2003) dataset from 
which I primarily use the ‘rule of law’ index as this fits the standard theoretical 
considerations closest. These data result from principal components analyses with a 
large number of primary indices; they are controlled for various spurious influences and 
are therefore often considered the first choice of indicators of governance due to the 
meticulous care with which they are constructed. In an alternative set of regressions I 
use either an average of all six Kaufmann indices as statistical separation of these 
indices have proven rather difficult, an index of government effectiveness from the 
same source, or an index of legal quality from the economic freedom indices published 
by the Fraser Institute (Gwartney and Lawson, 2002).
6
The initial 1970 GDP per capita in purchasing-power adjusted international dollars 
as well as a number of other variables derive from the Penn World Tables (Heston et al., 
2002). This also includes the 30-year averages of investment rates (% of GDP), 
government expenditures (% of GDP), openness (trade volume, % of GDP) and price 
distortions. The latter variable is the ratio of investment prices to the general price level, 
which arguably reflects the quality of investments and investment policy of a given 
country since both productivity and less distortionary policies are likely to result in 
lower relative investment prices, which works here as an outcome measure of 
investment policy. Government expenditure serves as a proxy for the size of the welfare 
state and thus allows exploring the set of particular transmission channels associated 
with welfare state effects. 
Growth is measured in the standard Barro-type way as the difference between the 
logs to GDP in 2000 and 1970, divided by 30. As a background variable for schooling, I 
also use the average fertility (births per woman), taken from World Bank (2004), as 
                                                   
5 The loadings in the principal components analysis are .89 (IQ), .89 (secondary schooling) and .91 (schooling 
length) yielding one component with an eigenvalue of 2.42 explaining 81 percent of the variation. It should be 
stressed that I remain agnostic with respect to the question whether the IQ scores reflect genetic variation or 
simply a combination of the quantity and quality of schooling in different countries as both would affect 
schooling, the first through underlying any human capital investment, the second by making IQ scores a rough 
measure of schooling quality. 
6 The correlations across the six Kaufmann et al. indices are all in the vicinity of .8. Bjørnskov (2006) therefore 
employs principal components analysis to form an overall governance index, which preserves more than 90% 
of the variation in the six indices. 
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constrained families (e.g. Becker and Lewis, 1973). Finally, I employ a standard set of 
background variables of trust (see e.g. Knack and Zak, 2002; Uslaner, 2002; Bjørnskov, 
2005). The set includes income inequality measured by Gini coefficients deriving from 
the Deininger and Squire (1996) dataset, data on monarchies and the religious 
composition of the population from CIA (2004) supplemented by USDS (2004), and 
ethnic diversity, measured as the probability that two random citizens of a country do 
not share ethnicity, taken from Alesina et al. (2003). All data are summarized in Table 
1. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
A first indication of where to search for effects of social trust is provided in Table 2, 
which reports the simple and partial correlations between trust and variables capturing a 
number of potential transmission channels. It is apparent in the table that although the 
simple correlations with all but openness are large, the partial correlations when 
controlling for GDP per capita in 1970 show somewhat different results. Openness, the 
price distortion and government expenditures are far from being significantly correlated 
with social trust; the latter even has the ‘wrong’ sign. The partial correlations for 
schooling, rule of law, the alternative governance indicators, and the investment rate 
remain significant and in the former four cases also of substantial size. However, 
whether these correlations reflect causal influences and in which directions these 
influences work must be subject to further scrutiny in the two following sections in 
which all but one variable are analyzed. The exception is openness, which not even has 




INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
                                                   
7 It should be noted that while the extent of trade does not seem to be affected by social trust, the direction of 
trade – i.e. the choice of trading partners – may still to some degree depend on trust (den Butter and Mosch, 
2003; de Groot et al., 2004). 
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two- and three-stage least squares regression. The two-stage least squares regressions 
(2SLS) are naturally used to inform about the causality between social trust and the 
potential transmission mechanisms while Zelner and Theil’s (1962) three-stage 
regression procedure (3SLS) is utilized as a way to trace the effects of trust through the 
transmission mechanisms to economic growth. Results are reported in a series of tables 
in which the bottom panels report sample size, pseudo R squared, either F- or Chi-
statistics and the root mean square error (RMSE). In connection with 2SLS results I also 
report Sargan’s test for overidentification, which is often used as a test of exogeneity of 
instrumental variables given that at least one of the instruments is truly exogenous. This 
is certainly the case since the religious composition of populations has been fairly stable 
for very long periods of time, and historical variables such as having a monarchy or a 
communist past cannot be changed. 
To render it probable that the findings are not spurious, I perform two types of 
robustness tests. All regressions in section 5 are run on three different samples. The full 
sample naturally consists of all countries for which a full data set is available while the 
reduced sample consists of the full sample minus the tails of the trust distribution; i.e., 
countries with trust levels above 60% or below 10%. The countries excluded in the 
reduced sample are Denmark, Norway and Sweden (high-trust countries), and Brazil, 
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru, the Philippines, Tanzania and Uganda (low-trust countries). 
A third sample determined by the regression using the full sample consists of excluding 
the observations with the largest absolute residuals in each case such that the sample 
size employed is the same as in the reduced sample.
8 The second robustness test 
consists in re-estimating the relations using alternative indicators for schooling and 
governance to test for the possibility that effects are specific to a single indicator; the 
results of these tests are reported in an appendix. I do not control for robustness to the 
empirical specification or specific omitted variables; interested readers are instead 
referred to Beugelsdijk et al. (2004) and Bengtsson et al. (2005), both of which 
demonstrate that the growth effects of social trust are fairly robust in that sense. 
 
                                                   
8 Instead of excluding observations with residuals that are large in an absolute sense, I use this approach since 
the sample sizes can otherwise get rather small in some cases due to the relatively large standard errors 
generated by the 3SLS estimator. 
  134. Determinants of social trust 
This section only briefly explores the determinants of social trust, as it repeats the basic 
findings in Uslaner (2002) and Bjørnskov (2005). The main purpose of this exercise is 
to test for the reverse causality suggested by some of the social capital literature. The 
results reported in Table 3 first of all show that income equality is one of the primary 
determinants of social trust - as Uslaner (2002) stresses, it is not the level but the 
distribution of income that matters. GDP per capita is therefore not included as it is 
entirely unrelated to trust. The table also provides confirmation of the finding that 
monarchies have higher trust levels, as do countries with substantial Protestant 
populations while Muslim populations tend in the other direction and postcommunist 
countries have trust deficits, all other things being equal. On the other hand, contrary to 
previous literature ethnic diversity is not significantly associated with social trust in this 
sample of countries. Although the coefficient is always negative and of roughly the 
same size throughout a variety of different specifications (not shown), its significance 
appears to depend highly on which countries are included. Clearly, although this 
question must await future research there is need for more work on the circumstances 
under which diversity can lead to lower trust. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Turning to one of the main purposes of this paper - the causality of the potential 
transmission mechanisms to growth - the 2SLS estimates in the table reject that there 
are any effects of schooling, rule of law or government expenditure (proxying for 
welfare effects) on social trust. As such, a more careful control for reverse causality 
leads to a rejection of results in a number of earlier studies that implied a more 
optimistic assessment of the potential of policy-induced effects on social trust (Knack 
and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001; Knack and Zak, 2002). It should be noted that 
the insignificance is not a result of weak instruments, as the F-statistic in the first-stage 
regression with rule of law is 70.41, with governance 69.47 and with legal quality 
23.81; the instruments therefore easily pass both Staiger and Stock’s rule of thumb and 
the Sargan tests. Although a number of studies have argued for an effect of these 
features the findings here are therefore consistent with those studies relying on more 
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move on to the main topic after this intermezzo. The variables included in the 
specification in column 3 of Table 3, which employs the full sample used in the growth 
regressions in the following, are used as instruments for social trust in the next section.  
 
5. Economic consequences of social trust 
As section 4 documents, the direction of causality must necessarily run from social trust 
to a set of variables capturing potential transmission mechanisms if the correlations in 
Table 2 are not spurious. These mechanisms eventually connect trust to growth either 
directly or through the investment rate. 
 
5.1. Direct consequences of social trust 
Table 4 firstly looks at the direct consequences of social trust on schooling and the rule 
of law, both estimated by 2SLS. Beginning with the former, the results clearly support 
that trust is a determinant of schooling alongside fertility and the initial GDP per capita, 
a set of findings that proves robust to being estimated in any of the three samples and 
explains the bulk of the variation in the data. As schooling seems to be affected by 
social trust but does not affect trust, the evidence thereby confirms the findings of 
previous studies showing that higher levels of social trust lead to higher levels of 
schooling (e.g. la Porta et al., 1997; Putnam, 2000; Bjørnskov, 2005). The effect is 
robust to changes in the sample although the exclusion of outliers generates a large and 
less significant coefficient. On the other hand, the findings in the previous section 
suggest that there is no effect in the opposite direction. In total, the findings here 
therefore contradict the conclusions reached in previous studies using simple OLS that 
schooling can create trust. 
The second significant effect to be found in these data is that of social trust on the 
rule of law, which turns out to be strongly positive and thus confirms previous findings 
(e.g. Putnam, 1993; Knack, 2002; Uslaner, 2002). Once again, the specification does a 
good job explaining the variation. However, as the findings in Table 3 rejected that the 
rule of law affects trust but those in Table 4 confirm the opposite direction of causality, 
the evidence firmly rejects the conjecture in e.g. Zak and Knack (2001) and Berggren 
and Jordahl (in press) that formal institutions can create social trust. The causal effect 
  15from trust to the rule of law is moreover robust to changes in the sample although the 
coefficient in the sample without potential outliers is somewhat smaller than in either of 
the other samples. In addition, the findings also reconfirm the well-known positive 
effects of income and on the rule of law as well as confirming that openness to trade has 
a positive effect, cf. Rodrik et al. (2004). 
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These findings could still be indicator-specific, a point explored in the corresponding 
appendix Table A.4. The table presents the findings with alternative indicators, showing 
that two out of three schooling indicators are significantly affected by social trust. In the 
last, the effect on the IQ of social trust is not significant, which may nonetheless be an 
artifact of the way Lynn and Vanhanen (2002) treat missing observations.
9 The effect of 
trust on governance is also quite robust, as the coefficient in regressions with all three 
alternative indicators remains significant and of approximately the same size. Any 
influence of trust on the remaining potential transmission channels is nonetheless 
rejected; results are reported in Table 5. Government expenditure is negatively related 
to income but there is no effect of social trust. Neither is there a direct influence of trust 
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9 Lynn and Vanhanen’s (2002) chosen procedure for estimating IQ in countries without a national survey 
consists in taking the average of IQ in neighbouring countries with roughly the same ethnic composition. This 
procedure therefore induces an artificial intraregional similarity that makes identification of an effect of trust 
rather difficult in the presence of regional fixed effects. Without such effects, trust becomes significant at p<.10 
with a coefficient of .088, implying that a one standard deviation shock to trust would result in an increase in 
IQ of 15% of a standard deviation. 
10 Any potential influence from trust on government expenditures turns out to be spurious since ethnic diversity 
(not shown) is negatively related to government expenditure (cf. Alesina et al., 2003). Tests also reject that 
trust has an indirect effect on the investment policy variable. Given the lack of other determinants, one might 
well take this is evidence that there is a strong element of investment policy in this variable as it is supposed to 
measure. 
  165.2. Effects on investments and growth 
Noting that schooling and the rule of law but not other variables are directly affected by 
social trust, the next step in the analysis is to trace these effects through the economy. In 
particular, the effects could either directly influence the growth rate or indirectly 
through the investment rate. The results presented in Table 6 are therefore estimated by 
3SLS. When firstly turning to the determinants of the investment rate, openness leads to 
more investments as is standard, although this effect is only significant at p<.10 in the 
reduced sample. The logarithm to initial income per capita is significantly negatively 
related to the investment rate, which the investment price distortion quite naturally also 
is. However, when interpreting the large negative effect of income it should be held in 
mind that both investment policy (price distortions) and schooling is positively 
associated with income. Calculating the cumulative effect of initial income, this 
becomes virtually zero since both schooling and the investment price distortion are 
strongly positively associated with the investment rate. Initial income is to a large extent 
the result of amassed past investments; hence the negative effect of initial income 
simply indicates that there are decreasing returns to scale of investments, all other 
things being equal. Conversely, neither the rule of law nor the alternative governance 
indicators tested in appendix Table A.3 are associated with the investment rate. It 
follows that social trust exerts an influence on the investment rate, but not directly as 
suggested by Zak and Knack (2001). Rather, it is the influence on schooling that makes 
production more efficient and therefore prompts more investments by increasing the 
productivity of such investments. Since the inclusion of a direct effect of social trust in 
the regressions always produces insignificant coefficients with t-statistics well below 
one, it seems safe to conclude that the investment effects of trust through schooling are 
exhaustive. Moreover, the simple robustness tests reported in Table A.3 in the appendix 
replicate the investment results with the three alternative governance indicators in order 
to test whether the findings are particular to the choice of the rule of law index. The 
results are nearly identical across the columns and they are therefore not particular to 
any single measure of governance. 
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  17The final step is to trace the effects to economic growth, as is done in the three right 
hand side columns in Table 6, that again report 3SLS estimates. The results for one 
thing reproduce three standard findings: 1) a strong conditional convergence effect; 2) a 
growth effect of investments; and 3) an effect of the rule of law. The implications are 
nevertheless slightly different than is standard. Firstly, the results show that the growth 
effects of schooling work through the investment channel, which in itself is a new 
finding. As for example Topel (1999) calls for more evidence of how schooling 
transmits to growth while documenting that schooling increases labor productivity, the 
findings presented in Table 6 support the notion that human capital is a complement to 
investments in physical capital. In other words, the effects of schooling are consistent 
with a theoretical explanation stating that it leads to an increase in the rate of 
innovations or technological diffusion (e.g. Nelson and Phelps, 1966; Romer, 1990). 
Since social trust is a strong determinant of schooling, the results provide confirmation 
of one of the potential transmission mechanisms as suggested by Zak and Knack (2001) 
although with the difference that the trust effect is indirect.  
Secondly, there is an additional effect of social trust running through the 
governance channel, which is more direct. The rule of law does not affect investments 
or investment prices, but provides a direct effect that can be interpreted as causing an 
increase in total factor productivity. Although this result contrasts the well-known 
findings in Mauro (1995), it is consistent with more recent studies by e.g. Hall and 
Jones (1999) and Méon and Weill (2005) who suggest that governance leads to higher 
aggregate productivity, not necessarily a higher investment rate. The same conclusions 
apply to the three other governance measures reported in appendix Table A.3. Finally, it 
should be noted that entering social trust in the investment and growth equations in any 
of these systems proved to generate coefficients far from significance; the effects 
running through schooling and governance thus seem exhaustive of the full effect of 
trust. 
In total, the findings suggest that social trust translates into economic growth 
through two main channels: raising the schooling level and improving governance. 
Table 7 below summarizes the transmission channels and the size of the effects. Raising 
the trust level of an average country from the global average to approximately the level 
of North America – a change corresponding to a one standard deviation shock to social 
  18trust - results in an increase of roughly one percentage point in the growth rate of GDP 
(60% of a standard deviation) through the two channels outlined above, all other things 
being equal. The contributions to growth of such a shock through the transmission 
mechanisms in the full sample are 26% and 34% (of a standard deviation) from 
schooling and rule of law, respectively; 16% and 26% in the reduced sample; and 32% 
and 31% in the sample without outliers, although it should be noted that the explanatory 
power of the specification is reduced when using the latter sample. No result is 
indicator-specific and the only real difference between the three sets of results 
pertaining to the different samples is that excluding outliers shifts the balance of 
importance towards the schooling channel.  
 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
Although the samples are larger, the total effect of social trust on economic growth in 
the full sample and samples without outliers therefore approximately corresponds to that 
found by previous studies. For example, the results in Zak and Knack (2001) indicate 
that a one standard deviation shock to social trust generates an increase in the growth 
rate of about 60% of a standard deviation, i.e. an identical effect, while the estimate in 
Whiteley (2000) based on a slightly different trust indicator is somewhat larger. 
Beugelsdijk et al. (2004), exposing the trust-growth association to various robustness 
exercises, find effects of a one standard deviation shock ranging from 1.05 percentage 
points, corresponding to about two-thirds of a standard deviation, to a lower bound of 
.65 percentage points. The present results may therefore range in the upper region of a 
natural confidence interval although it must be stressed that they are subject to 
considerable uncertainty, not least because of the chosen estimation procedure. The 
effect using estimates without outliers is virtually identical to the one obtained in the 
full sample while the reduced sample generates a somewhat smaller effect. When 
instead using the lowest estimates throughout irrespective of which sample they derive 
from one gets a cumulative effect of a one standard deviation shock to trust of .57 
percentage points, corresponding to 35% of a standard deviation of which roughly half 
derives from each channel. This is fairly close to the relatively low estimate obtained in 
the robustness exercises in Bengtsson et al. (2005) and to the lower bound in 
  19Beugelsdijk et al. (2004), and may thus be indicative of the importance of observations 
in the tails of the trust distribution.
11 However, it seems safe to conclude that the effects 
of trust are due to neither coincidental problems in countries with the lowest trust scores 
nor any specific Scandinavian excellence or other outlier influences. Although the 
estimates of the total effect are surrounded by a large confidence interval, the findings 
remain significant throughout and therefore warrant some discussion. 
 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
A number of studies in the economic growth literature have in recent years found social 
trust to be an important and robust determinant of economic growth. Starting with 
Knack and Keefer’s (1997) ground-breaking work, most studies have implicitly offered 
a set of different explanations for the result although none have dealt explicitly with the 
inherent causality issues. The purpose of this paper has been to explore the transmission 
channels through which social trust affects economic growth, taking these problems into 
account. Although an array of possibilities has been brought forward in the social 
capital literature, the findings in this paper suggest that trust has identifiable effects 
through two channels only: schooling and governance. Contrary to previous suggestions 
in the social capital literature and given that instrumental variables can inform about 
causality in cross-sectional analysis, the findings support that causality runs from social 
trust to schooling and governance, not the other way. Trust therefore appears to be a 
deeper determinant of economic development than any of these variables, a claim lent 
more intuitive validity by noting that growth rates have fluctuated and both schooling 
and the rule of law in general have improved in the 30-year period in question. 
Meanwhile, the social trust scores obtained from international surveys have been 
remarkably stable over time, which is difficult to reconcile with the idea that schooling 
or governance should have caused the present levels of social trust (Uslaner, 2002; 
Volken, 2002; Bjørnskov, 2005).  
                                                   
11 It should be noted that when doing the opposite, i.e. calculating the total effect of trust on growth by using 
the largest estimates, the effect of a one standard deviation shock is 1.31 percentage points, or 80% of a 
standard deviation. Note also that Bengtsson et al. (2005) includes a measure of schooling in their baseline 
specification and thus induces a downwards bias in all estimates. When adjusting for this bias, relying on the 
estimated effect of schooling in the present paper, their imputed average estimate is fairly close to the estimated 
effect of governance in this paper. 
  20However, two questions remain unresolved. Firstly, everything might still be 
endogenous in the very long run. The possibility for example exists that a strong rule of 
law could protect existing trust from deteriorating when society is hit by an adverse 
shock, i.e. the existence of a fair legal system could work to contain societal 
developments that in countries with weaker systems may cause a decrease in trust. A 
potential case in point could be the postcommunist transition in which the already low 
trust levels seem to have deteriorated in some countries as the organization of society 
was radically changed while the legal systems failed to provide much protection for 
ordinary citizens in most of these countries. Likewise, a strong educational system 
could potentially work to perpetuate both high and low levels of social trust much in the 
same way as Bourdieu (1986) argued that the French schooling system reproduces the 
existing social structure. This would, however, not imply that a weak educational 
system is beneficial to the development of social trust but only that the system in low-
trust countries probably should focus on communicating measurable skills that might 
increase social mobility and not democratic norms or other ‘soft’ skills that could 
perpetuate existing inequalities.  
Secondly, it must be stressed that for now it is unknown whether the effects of 
social trust on schooling and governance arise mainly due to what can be thought of as 
either demand or supply effects. The standard theories in the social capital literature 
explain the effect of trust on schooling as a supply reaction due to students gaining easy 
access to the human capital of other people in high-trust societies. Yet, an equally 
probable explanation could rest on firms’ demand for educated labor due to lower costs 
associated with monitoring workers with complex work tasks in high-trust countries. On 
the other hand, effects of social trust on governance have traditionally been explained as 
effects of higher demand for good governance from high-trust voters. Relying on 
arguments first proposed by Arrow (1972), higher trust might also lead to improved 
governance by increasing the supply of honest bureaucrats and politicians who will be 
likely to make unbiased policy choices. Which mechanisms dominate remains an open 
question. 
The final step in the paper has been to make the connection to economic growth. 
The empirical results support that schooling positively affects the investment rate, 
which is not standard but could be expected given Topel’s (1999) finding that schooling 
  21improves labor productivity. By affecting the returns to input factors positively, 
improved schooling leads to an increased investment rate, which in turn - as is standard 
- leads to a higher growth rate. Governance, on the other hand, is not associated with the 
investment rate but affects economic growth directly, probably due to its effects on 
overall transaction costs and therefore on the growth of total factor productivity. As 
social trust affects both these variables, the estimates provide evidence that the 
transmission mechanisms through which trust affects growth are schooling and 
governance. Moreover, these mechanisms seem exhaustive of the effects. 
Overall, the present paper provides evidence that social trust is a deep determinant 
of economic development by affecting the quality of governance and schooling. These 
findings should, however, not be taken to imply that the distribution of economic 
success or failure in the world is culturally predetermined. Consistent with the estimates 
presented here, trade policy also has an effect through both an investment channel and a 
governance channel although trade volume is not associated with social trust. 
Furthermore, economic history clearly shows that there are different paths to wealth and 
any explanation relying only on the effects of cultural features stable over time would 
contradict the obvious existence of convergence mechanisms. For example, social trust 
in France – one of the world’s richest countries - is somewhat below the global average, 
and fast developers like Malaysia and Singapore also score low on the index. Having a 
high degree of social trust in society nonetheless seems to make beneficial institutional 
and educational development more likely. To the extent that countries do not enjoy that 
advantage, the importance of other policy measures simply becomes even more crucial 




INSERT TABLE A.1 ABOUT HERE 
 
INSERT TABLE A.2 ABOUT HERE 
 
INSERT TABLE A.3 ABOUT HERE 
 
  22References 
Alesina, A., A. Devleeschauwer, W. Easterly, S. Kurlat, and R. Wazciarg. (2003). 
“Fractionalization,” Journal of Economic Growth 8, 155-194. 
Anderson, J.E., and D. Marcouiller. (2002). “Insecurity and the Pattern of Trade: An 
Empirical Investigation,” Review of Economics and Statistics 84, 342-352. 
Arrow, K.J. (1972). “Gifts and Exchanges,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 1, 343-367. 
Barro, R.J. (1991). “Economic Growth in a Cross-Section of Countries,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 106, 407-443. 
Barro, R.J., and J-W. Lee. (2001). “International Data on Educational Attainment: 
Updates and Implications,” Oxford Economic Papers 53, 541-63. 
Becker, G.S., and H.G. Lewis. (1973). “On the Interaction Between the Quantity and 
Quality of Children,” Journal of Political Economy 81, S279-288. 
Bengtsson, M., N. Berggren, and H. Jordahl. (2005). “Trust and Growth in the 1990s: A 
Robustness Analysis”, Working Paper no. 60, the Ratio Institute. 
Berggren, N. (2003). “The Benefits of Economic Freedom: A Survey,” The Independent 
Review 8, 193-211. 
Berggren, N., and H. Jordahl. (in press). “Free to Trust? Economic Freedom and Social 
Capital,” Forthcoming in Kyklos. 
Beugelsdijk, S., H.L.F. de Groot, and A.B.T.M. van Schaik. (2004). ”Trust and 
Economic Growth: A Robustness Analysis. Oxford Economic Papers 56, 118-134. 
Bjørnskov, C. (2005). Investigations in the Economics of Social Capital. PhD thesis, 
Aarhus School of Business. 
Bjørnskov, C. (2006). “The Multiple Facets of Social Capital,” European Journal of 
Political Economy 22, 22-40. 
Bourdieu, P. (1986). “The Forms of Capital.” In John G. Richardson (ed), Handbook of 
Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education. New York: Greenwood Press. 
Bruni, L., and R. Sugden. (2000). “Moral Canals: Trust and Social Capital in the Work 
of Hume, Smith and Genovesi,” Economics and Philosophy 16, 21-45. 
CIA. (2004). The CIA World Factbook 2004. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence 
Agency.  
Coleman, J.S. (1988). “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital,” American 
Journal of Sociology 94, S95-S120. 
  23Deininger, K., and L. Squire. (1996). “A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality,” 
World Bank Economic Review 10, 565-569. 
Den Butter, F.A.G., and R. Mosch. (2003). “Trade, Trust and Transaction Cost,” 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 03-082/3. 
De Groot, H.L.F., G-J. Linders, P. Rietveld, and U. Subramanian. (2004). “The 
Institutional Determinants of Bilateral Trade Patterns,” Kyklos 57, 103-123. 
Dollar, D., and A. Kraay. (2003). “Institutions, Trade, and Growth,” Journal of 
Monetary Economics 50, 133-162. 
Durlauf, S. (2002). “On the Empirics of Social Capital,” The Economic Journal 112, 
459-479. 
Greif, A. (1989). “Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade. Evidence on the 
Maghribi Traders,” Journal of Economic History 49, 857-882. 
Greif, A. (1994). “On the Political Foundations of the Late Medieval Commercial 
Revolution. Genoa during the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries,” Journal of Economic 
History 54, 271-287. 
Gwartney, J., and R. Lawson. (2002). Economic Freedom of the World: 2002 Annual 
Report. Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 
Hall, R., and C. I. Jones. (1999). “Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More 
Output per Worker than Others?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 83-116. 
Helliwell, J.F., and R. Putnam. (1995). “Economic Growth and Social Capital in Italy,” 
Eastern Economic Journal 21, 295-307. 
Heston, A., R. Summers, and B. Aten. (2002). “Penn World Tables, Version 6.1,” 
Center for International Comparisons (CICUP), University of Pennsylvania. 
Inglehart, R., M. Basañez, J. Díez-Medrano, L. Halman, and R. Luijkx. (2004). Human 
Beliefs and Values. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Jacobs, J. (1961). The Death and Life of Great American Cities. New York: Random 
House. 
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi. (2003). “Governance Matters III: 
Governance Indicators for 1996-2002”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
no. 3106. 
  24Knack, S. (2001). “Trust, Associational Life and Economic Performance.” In  John F. 
Helliwell (ed), The Contribution of Human and Social Capital to Sustained Economic 
Growth and Well-Being. Quebec: Human Resources Development Canada. 
Knack, S. (2002). “Social Capital and the Quality of Government: Evidence from the 
US States,” American Journal of Political Science 46, 772-785. 
Knack, S., and P. Keefer. (1995). “Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-
Country Tests using Alternative Institutional Measures,” Economics and Politics 7, 207-
227. 
Knack, S., and P. Keefer. (1997). “Does Social Capital have an Economic Pay-Off? A 
Cross-Country Investigation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 1251-1288. 
Knack, S., and P.J. Zak. (2002). “Building Trust: Public Policy, Interpersonal Trust, and 
Economic Development,” Supreme Court Economic Review 10, 91-107. 
Kormendi, R.C., and P.G. Meguire. (1985). “Macroeconomic Determinants of Growth: 
Cross-Country Evidence,” Journal of Monetary Economics 16, 141-163. 
Kumlin, S., and B. Rothstein (forthcoming). “Making and Breaking Social Capital: The 
Impact of Welfare State Institutions,” Forthcoming in Comparative Political Studies. 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R.W. Vishny. (1997). “Trust in 
Large Organizations,” American Economic Review 87, 333-338. 
Levine, R., and D. Renelt. (1992). “A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth 
Regressions,” American Economic Review 82, 942-963. 
Lorgelly, P.K., and P.D. Owen. (1999). “The Effect of Female and Male Schooling on 
Economic Growth in the Barro-Lee Model,” Empirical Economics 24, 537-557. 
Loury, G. (1977). “A Dynamic Theory of Racial Income Differences.” In Phyllis 
Wallace and Anette M. LaMond (eds), Women, Minorities, and Employment. 
Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. 
Luhman, N. (1979). Trust and Power. New York: John Wiley. 
Lynn, R., and T. Vanhanen. (2002). IQ and the Wealth of Nations. Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press. 
Mauro, P. (1995). “Corruption and Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, 681-
712. 
Méon, P-G., and L. Weill. (2005). “Does Better Governance Foster Efficiency? An 
Aggregate Frontier Analysis,” Economics of Governance 6, 75-90. 
  25Nelson, R.R., and E.S. Phelps. (1966). “Investment in Humans, Technological 
Diffusion, and Economic Growth,” American Economic Review 56, p. 69-75. 
Pritchett, L. (2001). “Where Has All the Education Gone?” World Bank Economic 
Review 15, 367-391. 
Putnam, R. (1993). Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Putnam, R. (2000). Bowling Alone. The Collapse and Revival of American 
Community. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Putnam, R. (2001). “Social Capital: Measurement and Consequences,” ISUMA 2, 41-
51. 
Rice, T.W., and A. Sumberg. (1997). “Civic Culture and Democracy in the American 
States,” Publius 23, 99-114. 
Rodrik, D., A. Sumbramanian, and F. Trebbi. (2004). “Institutions Rule: the Primacy of 
Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development,“ Journal of 
Economic Growth 9, 131-165. 
Romer, P. (1990). “Endogenous Technological Change,” Journal of Political Economy 
98, S71-S102. 
Rothstein, B. (2003). “Social Capital, Economic Growth and Quality of Government,” 
New Political Economy 8, 49-72. 
Staiger, D., and J.H. Stock. (1997). “Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak 
Instruments,” Econometrica 65, 557-86. 
Stolle, D. (1998). “Bowling Together, Bowling Alone: the Development of Generalized 
Trust in Voluntary Associations,” Political Psychology 14, 497-525. 
Svendsen, G.T. (2004).“The Bumblebee in Economics. Can Social Capital Help 
Explaining the Welfare State?” Mimeo, University of Aarhus.  
Temple, J. (2001). “Generalizations that aren’t? Evidence on education and growth,” 
European Economic Review 45, 905-918. 
Topel, R. (1999). “Labor Markets and Economic Growth.” In Orley C. Ashenfelter and 
David Card (eds), Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3C. Amsterdam: North-
Holland. 
USDS. (2004). International Religious Freedom Report 2004. Washington, DC: United 
States Department of State. 
  26Uslaner, E.M. (2002). The Moral Foundations of Trust. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Volken, T. (2002) “Generalisiertes Vertrauen: Zur Reliabilität und Validität eines 
verbreiteten Messinstruments in Wirtschaftssoziologisches 
Forschungszusammenhängen.” Mimeo, University of Zürich. 
Wacziarg, R. (2001). “Measuring the Dynamic Gains to Trade,” World Bank Economic 
Review 15, 393-429. 
Weede, E., and S. Kämpf. (2002). ”The Impact of Intelligence and Institutional 
Improvement on Economic Growth,” Kyklos 55, 361-380. 
Whiteley, P. (2000). “Economic Growth and Social Capital,” Political Studies 48, 443-
466. 
World Bank. (2004). World Development Indicators. Washington DC: the World Bank. 
Zak, P.J., and S. Knack. (2001). “Trust and Growth,” The Economic Journal 111, 295-
321. 
Zelner, A and H. Theil. (1962). “Simultaneous Estimation of Simultaneous Equations,” 
Econometrica 30, 54-78. 
 
  27 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean  Standard  deviation  Observations 
Economic growth  1.724  1.637  73 
Ethnic diversity  .367  .233  80 
Fertility .3051  1.498  80 
Governance .449  .958  74 
Government effectiveness  .498  1.0318  79 
Government expenditure  17.974  8.477  79 
Income inequality  39.68  10.64  80 
Investment rate  18.326  2.927  74 
Legal quality   6.358  2.031  74 
Log initial GDP per capita  8.4946  .8590  79 
Monarchy .177  .384  80 
Openness   61.608  42.874  71 
Population growth  1.645  .999  69 
Postcommunist .177  .384 80 
Price distortion  1.349  .575  69 
Rule of law  .448  1.040  79 
Schooling .050  1.568  64 
Share of Buddhists  3.723  17.454  80 
Share of Hindi  1.377  9.313  80 
Share of Muslims  8.09  22.00  80 
Share of Protestants  17.56  28.33  80 
Social trust  28.128  14.789  80 
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Table 2  
Correlations with social trust 
  Simple correlation  Partial correlation  Observations 
Schooling .609  .432***  65 
Rule of law  .676  .513***  72 
Investment rate  .472  .211*  72 
Price distortion  -.368  -.055  69 
Openness   .077  -.128  72 
Government expenditure  -.348  -.149  72 
Governance .653  .468***  72 
Legal quality  .594  .438***  69 
Note: *** (**) [*] denotes significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10]. Partial correlations are controlled for initial 






Determinants of social trust 
Dependent variable  Social trust 
Estimation method
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Muslims -.0963***  -.0948*** 









Monarchy 10.0360***  9.8889*** 













Rule of law          1.1752 
(3.1505) 
 
Government  expenditure -.5150
(.6079) 
Observations 82 81 64 64 71 71
Pseudo  R squared
 
                 
           
             
.495 .505 .536 .553 .511 .485
F-statistic 14.70 15.78 13.47 14.55 11.82 12.45
RMSE 9.6929 9.6014 9.9554 9.8285 9.9933 10.251
Sargan test, p<        .3788  .3316  .3432 
Note: robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** (**) [*] denotes significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10].  Instruments for schooling in column four are the log to GDP per capita 1970 
and the average fertility rate; for governance in column five the log to GDP per capita 1970, openness and a dummy for common law systems; and for government expenditure in 
column six the log to GDP per capita 1970. 
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Table 4  
Direct consequences of social trust 
Dependent variable  Schooling  Rule of law 
Estimation method
 
               
             
             
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Sample Full Reduced No  outliers Full Reduced No outliers
1 2 3 4 5 6












Fertility     
   
             
-.5064***  -.5274*** 
(.1521)  (.1899) 
-.4754** 
(.1860) 






























Observations 65 56 56 72 63 63
Pseudo  R squared
   
                 
           
             
                 
.827 .827 .695 .753 .702 .880
F statistic 45.68 40.81 19.07 37.47 31.33 80.45
RMSE .6673 .6764 .7503 .5533 .5766 .3402
Sargan test, p< .7662 .5462 .7039 .2646 .2346 .3140
Note: robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** (**) [*] denotes significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10]. All regressions contain regional effects and a constant term. The first stage 
regression for social trust corresponds to that in Table 3, column 3. Due to problems of overidentification in column 6, instrumental variables also include the shares of Buddhists and 
Hindi in the population. 
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Table 5  
Direct consequences to trust – no effects 
Dependent variable  Price distortion  Government share of GDP 
Estimation method 
 
2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS 
Sample Full               
             
Reduced No outliers Full Reduced No outliers
1 2 3 3 4 5




































Postcommunist   













Observations 67 57 57 70 60 60
Pseudo R squared   .489  .593  .797  .158  .112  .430 
F statistic  12.29  13.50  32.07  4.15  2.90  12.80 
RMSE              .4178 .3154 .1772 7.1074 7.4322 4.2563
Sargan test, p<  .6154  .2041  .3844  .2870  .2885  .1451 
Note: robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** (**) [*] denotes significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10]. All regressions contain regional effects and a constant term. The first stage 






Investments and growth 1970-2000 
Dependent variable    Investment rate      Growth rate   
Estimation method
 
               
               
             
3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS
Sample Full Reduced No outliers Full Reduced No outliers
1 2 3 4 5 6












Openness   
   
   





























































Observations 63 54 54 63 54 54
Pseudo  R squared
 
                 
             
             
.738 .765 .764 .453 .557 .216
Chi squared 192.52 183.75 200.73 74.12 71.05 46.35
RMSE 3.3322 3.2444 3.2279 1.0596 .9173 1.1926
Note: robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** (**) [*] denotes significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10].  
  
 





Summary of transmission channels, cumulative effects 
Effect on:  Schooling  Rule of law  Investment rate  Growth rate 
























Note: numbers are effects of a one standard deviation shock to social trust; numbers in parentheses are effects 
as percent of a standard deviation of the dependent variable. 
 







Countries and social trust data 
Country Trust  Country  Trust 
Albania 25.7  Latvia  20.3 
Algeria 11.2  Lithuania  25.9 
Argentina 20.8  Luxembourg  25.9 
Armenia 24.7  Macedonia  10.9 
Australia 43.8  Malaysia  10.3
D
Austria 32.8  Malta  20.7 
Azerbaijan 20.5  Mexico  25.1 
Bangladesh 22.2  Moldova  18.4 
Belarus 30.5  Morocco  23.5 
Belgium 31.4  Netherlands  53.9 
Bolivia 17
L New Zealand  49.0 
Brazil 4.8  Nicaragua  20
L
Bulgaria 28.6  Nigeria  22.7 
Canada 46.9  Norway  63.9 
Chile 22.5  Pakistan  25.7 
Colombia 10.8  Panama  25
L
Costa Rica  7.4
D Paraguay 23
L
Croatia 21.0  Peru  7.8 
Czech Republic  27.5  Philippines  6.9 
Denmark 60.1  Poland  23.7 
Dominican Republic  26.4  Portugal  15.7 
Ecuador 8.9
D Romania 14.9 
Egypt 37.9  Russia  28.4 
El Salvador  14.6
D Singapore 16.9 
Estonia 23.9  Slovakia  21.9 
Finland 56.4  Slovenia  18.2 
France 23.3  South  Africa  22.2 
Georgia 18.7  South  Korea  32.5 
Germany 36.1  Spain  33.6 
Ghana 22.4  Sweden  62.3 
Greece 23.7  Switzerland  42.1 
Guatemala 28
L Taiwan 38.2 
Honduras 25
L Tanzania 8.1 
Hong Kong  26.8
D Thailand 38.9
D
Hungary 25.9  Turkey  10.4 
Iceland 41.5  Uganda  7.6 
India 38.3  Ukraine  29.1 
Indonesia 51.6  United  Kingdom  36.9 
Ireland 41.2  Uruguay  22.1 
Israel 23.5  USA  42.1 
Italy 31.4  Venezuela  14.8 
Japan 42.9  Vietnam  41.3 
Jordan 27.7  Zimbabwe  11.9 
Note: observations marked 
L derive from the 1995 Latinobarometro; observations marked 
D derive from the 






Trust results – alternative indicators 




               
           
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
1 2 3 4 5 6












Fertility     
   
             
-3.3519***  -.4396 
(.8143)  (.3489) 
-6.3278 
(4.4658) 






























Observations 77 64 74 70 69 70
Pseudo R squared  
   
.851  .676  .596  .689  .634  .749 
F statistic 49.55           
           
32.28 24.85 32.83 18.86 39.05
RMSE 3.668 1.3875 18.791 .519 1.2502 . 5197 
Sargan test, p<  .1696  .6782  .3233  .5180  .8018  .7574 
Note: robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** (**) [*] denotes significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10]. All regressions contain regional effects and a constant term. The first stage 
regression for social trust in columns 3 and 4 corresponds to that in Table 3, column 3. Instruments for governance and legal quality in columns 1 and 2 are the log to GDP per capita 
1970, openness and a dummy for common law systems. All results are obtained using the full sample. 
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Table A.3 
Economic growth 1970-2000, alternative governance indicators 
Dependent variable  Investment rate  Growth rate 
Estimation method
 
               
           
3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS
1 2 3 4 5 6












Openness   
   
 
       
         
    
         



















Schooling 2.7942***  4.0402*** 








































Observations 63 63 63 63 63 63
Pseudo  R squared
 
                 
             
             
.752 .727 .739 .296 .346 .483
Chi squared 185.96 174.79 181.30 60.82 63.26 69.86
RMSE 3.2142 3.3701 3.2939 1.2029 1.1593 1.0302
Note: robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** (**) [*] denotes significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10]. All results are obtained using the full sample. 
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